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uked for might be abused, the prudent course would not be to deny the needed au-
thority, but to draft a cause of action for damaie8 to rectify possible misapplication, 
or to provide for a sunset of the authority after a period of time sufficient to meet 
the present exigency. The possibility of abuse should not ob8CUJ'e the present need 
and the supposition of trust that one must have if our democratic order is to be safe-
guarded from those outside our borders who wish to subvert it. 
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this morning. 
Chairman FEINGOLD. Thank you, Dean. I am intrigued by this 
distinction between constitutional law and constitutional policy. I 
do think that there are questions of constitutional law here, but 
surely if there is such a separate area as constitutional policy, that 
is even more our responsibility than the United States Supreme 
Court because we are here to make policy. But I do appreciate your 
testimony. 
Now, I would like to turn to Professor David Cole. Professor Cole 
currently teaches at Georgetown University Law Center and he has 
long been associated with the Center for Constitutional Rights. In 
addition to litigating several impo~t First Amendment before 
the United States Supreme Court, P fessor Cole has written ex-
tensively on the issue before us today, ~o-authoring the book Ter-
rorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name 
of National Security. 
I welcome you, Professor, and you may proceed. 
STATEMENT OF DAVID COLE, PROFESSOR OF LAW, 
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, WASHINGTON, D.C. 
Mr. COLE. Thank you, Senator Feingold. 
Precisely because the terrorists violated every principle of civ-
ilized society, of human decency and of the rule of law, we must, 
in responding to the threat of terrorism, maintain our commit-
ments to principle. I want to suggest three principles. 
First, we should not overreact, as we have so often overreacted 
in the past in times of fear. 
Second, we should not sacrifice the constitutional principles for 
which we stand. 
Third, in balancing liberty and security, we should not trade the 
liberties of a vulnerable group-immigrants, and particularly Arab 
and Muslim immigrants-for the security of the majority. 
Unfortunately, the immigration provisions that have been ad-
vanced by the Bush administration, that have been proposed in the 
House ana that are now being considered in the Senate-Justice De-
partment negotiation violate all three principles. They overreact 
because they impose guilt by association for wholly innocent 
associational activity, and they authorize indefinite detention on 
the Attorney General's say-so of any such aJien. 
They sacrifice our constitutional principles, and this is constitu-
tional law, not constitutional policr.. Guilt by association, the Su-
preme Court says, violates the FIfth Amendment and the First 
Amendment, both of which apply, the Supreme Court has said, 
without distinction to Citizens and aliens living here. 
Executive detention without any showing of current dangerous-
ness or risk of flight, which is what the mandatory detention provi-
sion in the House bill would authorize, violates both substantive 
due process and procedural due process. And in reacting this way, 
we are trading the liberties of the few, of those without a voice, of 
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immigrants who can't vote, and particularly Arabs and Muslims, 
for the purported security of the rest of us. 
These are provisions which will, we know, be targeted at Arabs 
and Muslims, and not for their individual conduct, but for their 
group identity, the very type of thinking that underlies the hate 
crimes that we all so virulently 0ppoEe. 
First, guilt by association. Current law makes aliens deportable 
for terrorist activity, for supporting terrorist activity, for planning, 
facilitating, or encouraging terrorist activity any way, shape or 
form. The Bush proposal makes aliens deportable for any 
88sociational sUl>port of any group that has ever engaged in or used 
violence. There 18 no requirement of any nexus between the alien's 
support and the actual violence. 
If an immigrant in the 1980s gave money to the Mrican National 
Congress to support its non-violent struggles against apartheid, 
just as thousands of Americans did, he would be deportable under 
this statute for rroviding support to a terrorist organization. The 
African Nationa Con~ss also engaged in violent opposition to 
apartheid. The Aftican-National Congress was listed every year 
until it came to power as a terrorist organization by the Secretary 
of State. That wholly innocent activity would be a deportable activ-
ity. Is that a measured response? No. 
Even if the alien shows that his support was designed .to counter 
terrorist activity, that is no defense. So if an alien today wants to 
further the peace process in England by p,roviding peacemaking 
training to the IRA, he is deportable. Even If he can prove that his 
support furthered peace and countered terrorism, he is deportable. 
Is that a measured response? I sugffest no. 
The mandatory detention proviSIons are also clearly and plainly 
unconstitutional, for two reasons. First of all, they are essentially 
a form of preventive detention. The Supreme Court has held that 
preventive detention is only permissible under narrow cir-
cumstances where the Government shows dangerousnebd to others 
or risk of flight. Under the House bill and the Bush proposal, the 
Government would be permitted to engage in preventIve detention 
without any showing of dangerousness to others or risk of flight. 
Under the House bill, all they have to show is that they have 
. reasonable grounds to believe that someone is described in the ter-
rorist activity provisions of the bill. But then the terrorist activity 
provisions of the bill are defined so broadly that they include every 
- violent crime other than an armed robbery-every violent crime 
other than an armed robbery. That is not what the man on the 
street understands to be terrorism, that is not what the inter-
national community understands to be terrorism, and that is not 
a narrow class of people who pose a particular danger to society. 
Yet, that is the class of people who would be subject to mandatory 
detention under this provision. 
In addition, it would apply to people who gave money to the Afri-
can National Congress or who gave peace-making training to the 
IRA. Even if there is no evidence that those people pose a threat 
to national security or pose a risk of flight, the statute would au-
thorize their detention. 
The second problem: it authorizes indefinite detention. There . 
have been news reports that have suggested erroneously that the 
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HOUBe so),,-es this problem by requiring the filing of charges within 
seven days. That is wrong because whether or not charges are filed 
doesn't matter. The statute provides that mandatory indefinite de-
tention of aliens is permitted. -
Even if the alienlrevaiJs in his deportation proceeding and can-
not be removed an has a right. to remain here permanently, the 
statute provides for mandatory detection, not on a finding that the 
alien is a danger to society, but solely on a finding that the- Attor-
ney General had reasonable grounds to believe that he engaged in 
a crime of violence, that he was in a domestic dispute where he 
picked up a plate and threw it at his wife, or he was in a bar and 
picked up a broken bottle. That would constitute sufficient grounds 
for mandatory detention. That, I submit, is not a narrow, measured 
response. It is not the kind of careful consideration of civil liberties 
that we should be demanding in this time of fear. It is unfortu-
nately precisely the kind of overreacting that we have so often seen 
in the past. 
Thank you. 
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cole follows:] 
STATEMENT OF DAVID COLE,' PROFESSOR OF LAw, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAw 
CENTER, WASHINGTON, D.C. 
INTRODUCTION 
The deplorable and horrific attacks of September 11 have shocked and stunned 
us all, and have quite properly spurred' renewed consideration of our capability to 
forestall future attacks. Yet in domg 80, we must not rashly trample upon the very 
freedoms that we are fighting for. 
Nothing tests our commitments to principle like fear and terror. But as we take 
up what President Bush has called a fight for our freedoms, we must maintain our 
commitments to those freedoms at home. The attack of September 11, and in par-
ticular the fact that our intelligence agencies missed it entirely, requires a review 
of our law enforcement and intelligence authorities. Everyone agrees that more 
should be done to ensure the safety of American citizens at home and abroad. But 
we must be careful not to overreact, and should therefore insist that any response 
be measured and effective. 
Three principles must guide our response to threat of terrorism. First, we should 
not overreact In a time of fear, a mistake we have made all too often in the past. 
Second, we should not sacrifice the bedrock foundations of our constitutional democ-
racy-political freedom and equal treatment. And third, in balancing liberty and se-
curitr, we should not trade a vulnerable minority's liberties, namely the liberties of 
iIllD11grants in general or Arab and Muslim immigrants in particular, for the secu-
rity of the rest of us. 
The Administration's proposal seeks a wide range of new law enforcement powers. 
I will focus my remarks on the immigration section of the Administration proposal. 
In doing so, I will also refer to the Sensenbrenner·Conyers bini referred to as the 
PATRIOT Act, recently introduced in the House. In my view, tne Administration's 
proposal is neither measured nor effective, and unnecessarily sacrifices our commit-
ment to both equal treatment and political freedom. The PATRIOT Act mitigates 
some of the troubling aspects of the Administration's proposal, but remaine deeply 
problematic, and unconstitutional in several respects. I will focus my remarks on 
the Administration's proposal, but will also note where the PATRIOT Act differs. 
The Administration's proposal has four fundamental flaws: 
1) It indulges in guilt by association, a concept that the Supreme Court has 
rejected as "alien to the traditions of a free society and the First Amend· 
ment itselC NAACP v. Claipbme Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 932 (1982). 
2) It would apply its newly expanded deportation grounds for associational 
activity retroactively, making aliens deportable for activity that was wholly 
legal at the time they engaged in it. 
I Profeesor, Georgetown University Law Center, and attorney with the Center for Constitu-
tional Rights. 
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3) It authorizes the INS to detain immigrants potentially indp.finitely, even 
where they cannot be deported and have a legal right to live here perma-
nently. 
4) It resurrecte ideological exclusion-the notion that people can be ex-
cluded for their political beliefs-a concept Congress repudiated in 1990 
when it repealed the McCarran-Walter Act. 
HISTORY 
I will address each of these problems in turn. But before doing so, it is worth re-
viewing a little history. This is not the first time we have responded to fear by tar-
geting immigrants and treating them as suspect because of their group identities 
rather than their individual conduct. 
In 1919, a series of politically motivated bombin~ culminated in the bombing of 
Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer's home here In Washington, DC. Federal au· 
thorities responded by rounding up 6,000 suspected immigrants in 33 cities across 
the country. not for their part in the bombinlfs, but for their political affiliations. 
They were detained in overcrowded "bull pens, and beaten into signing confessions. 
Many of those arrested turned out to be citizens. In the end, 556 were deported, 
but for their political affiliations, not for their part in the bombings. 
In World War II, the attack on Pearl Harbor led to the internment of over 100,000 
persons, over two-thirds of whom were citizens of the United States, not because 
of individualized determinations that they posed a threat to national securitr or the 
war effort, but solely for their Japanese ancestry. The internment began 10 April 
1942, and the last camp was not closed until four years later, in March 1946. 
In the McCarthy era, we made it a Crime even to be a member of the Communist 
Party, and passed the McCarran·Walter Act, which authorized the government to 
keep out and expel noncitizens who advocated Communism or other proscribed 
ideas. or who belonged to the Communist Party or other groups that advocated pro-
scribed ideas. Under the McCarren·Walter Act, the United States denied visas to, 
among others, writers Gabriel Garcia Marques and Carlos Fuentes, and to Nino 
Pasti, former Deputy Commander of NATO, because he was going to speak against 
the deployment of nuclear cruise missiles. 
We have learned from these mistakes. The Palmer Raids are seen as an embar· 
rassment. In 1988, Congress paid restitution to the Japanese internees. In 1990, 
Congress repealed the McCarran-Walter Act p'?litical exclusion and deportation 
growlds. But at the time these actions were irutially taken, they all appeared rea· 
sonable in light of the threats we faced. This history should caution us to ask care· 
fully whether we have responded today in ways that avoid overreaction and are 
measured. to balance liberty and security. In several respects detailed below, the 
Administration's proposed Anti-Terrorism Act fails that test. 
COUNTERTERRORISM AUTHORITY IN EXISTING LAW 
In considering whether the Administration's bill is necessary, it is important to 
know what authority the government already has to deny admission to, detain, and 
deport aliens engaged in terrorist activity. The government already has extremely 
broad authority to act against any alien involved in or supporting any kind of ter· 
rorist activity: 
1. It may detain without bond any alien with any visa status violation ifit 
institutes removal proceedings and has reason to believe that he poses a 
threat to national security or a risk of flight. The alien need not be charged 
with terrorist activity. 8 U.S.C. § 1226. 8 C.F.R. § 241 The INS contends 
that it may detain such aliens on the basis of secret evidence presented in 
camera and ex parte to an immigration judge. 
2. It may deny entry to any alien it has reason to believe may engage inany 
unJawful activity in the United States, and to any member of a desigtlated 
terrorist group. It may do so on the basis of secret evidence. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(aX3). 
3. It may deport any alien who has engaged in terrorist activity. or sup-
ported terronst activity in any way. Terrorist activity is defined under ex-
Isting law very broadly, to include virtually any use or threat to use a fire· 
arm with intent to endanger person or property (other than for mere per· 
sonal monetary gain), and any provision of support for such activity. 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(aX4). Pursuant to the Alien Terrorist Removal provisions in 
the 1996 Antiterrorism Act, the INS may use secret evidence to establish 
deportability on terrorist activity grounds. 
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4. Relatedly, the Secretary of State haa broad, largely unreviewable author-
ity under the 1996 Anti-Tem)Jism and Effective Death Penalty Act to dea-
{gnate "foreign terrorist organizations" and thereby criminalize all material 
support to such Jroupa. 8 U.S.C. § 1189, 18 U.S.C. §2339B. This provision 
triggers criminal sanctions, and applies to immigrants and citizens alike. 
Osama bin Laden's organization is 80 designated, and thus it is a crime, 
P?JlUhabJe by up to 10 yean in prison, to provide any material support to 
his group. 
THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSED ANTI-TERRORISM ACT 
The immigration provisions of the Administration's Anti-Terrorism Act: (1) ex-
pand the grounds for deporting and denying entry to noncitizens; (2) expand the 
Secretary of State's authority to designate and cut off' funding to "foreign terrorist 
orga~tionst (3) create a new mandato!)' detention procedure for aliens certified 
as terrorists by the INS; (4) authorize the Secretary of State to share certain immi-
gration file information with foreign governments; and (5) require the FBI and the 
Attorney General to share certain crilhinal history data with the INS and the State 
De~artment to improve visa decision making. 
The most troubling provisions are the expanded grounds for deportation and ex-
clusion, and the new mandatory detention pi'ocedure. 
A. THE ADMINISTRATION BILL IMPOSES GUILT BY ASSOCIATION 
The term "terrorism" has the capacity to stop debate. Everyone opposes terrorism, 
which is commonly understcod to describe premeditated, politicallr-motivated vio-
lence directed at noncombatants. See 22 U.S.C. §2656ftd)(2) (defirung terrorism 88 
"premeditated, politically motivated violence pe~trated against noncombatant tar-
gets by subnational groups or clandestine agents ). . 
The INA, however, defines "terrorist activity" much more broadly, and under the 
Administration bill would define it beyond any common understanding of the term. 
Under current law, the INA defines "terrorist activity" to include any use or threat 
to use an "explosive or firearm (other than for mere ~r80nal monetary gain) with 
intent to endanger ... the safety of one or more indiVIduals or to cause substantial 
damage to property." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(aX3XBXii). Under the Administration bill, this 
would be expanded to inchlde the use or threat to use any "explosive, firearm or 
other weapon or da~eroU8 device" with the intent to endan~er person or p:operty. 
Section 201(a)(1)(BXh). This defirution encompasses a domestIC disturbance in which 
one party picks up a knife, a barroom brawl in which one party threatens another 
with a broken beer bottle, and a demonstration in which a rock is thrown at another 
person. It would also apply to any armed struggle in a civil war, even against re-
gimes that we consider totalitarian, dictatorial, or genocidal. Under this definition, 
all freedom fighters are terrorists. 2 • 
The PATRIOT Act would define "terrorist activity" even more broadly; to include 
the use of "any object" with intent to endanger person or property. Under this bill 
a demonstrator who threw a rock during a political demonstration would be treated 
as a "terrorist." 
The point is not that such routine acts of violence are acceptable, or that armed 
struggle is generally penniaaible. But to call virtually every crime of violence "ter-
rorism" is to trivialize the term. And because 80 much else in the Administration 
bilI and the PATRIOT Act turns on "terrorist activity," it is critical to keep in mind 
the stunning overbreadth of this definition. Government action that might seem rea-
sonable vis-a-vis a hijacker may not be justified vis-a-vis an immigrant who found 
himself in a bar fight, threw a rock during a demonstration, or who sent humani-
tarian aid to an organization involved in civil war. Yet the Administration bill 
draws no distinction between the hijacker, the humanitarian, the political demon-
strator, and the barroom brawler, 
2In his testimon,Y, Douglas Kmiec defends this expansion b'y erroneously stating that under 
current law, "an aJlen is insdmiMible and deportable for engagmg in terrorist activity only when 
the alien has usied explosives or fairares." Kmiec Statl!ment at 7. Thereforel he &rgUaa, the change is needed ~ encompass attacks like those of September 11. That ill p ainly wrong. In 
ita current from 8 U.S,C. I82(aX3)(B)(ii) already defines "terrorist activity" to include, among 
other things, "higlijackin.i or sabotage of any conveyance (including a governmental organiu-
lion) to do or abStain from doing any att as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of 
the individual eeizeod or detained: "a.ua.ssination,"the use of any biological, chemical, or nuclear 
weapvn, and the use or threat to U8e any explosive or firearm against person or property (other 
than for mere pel'8OnaJ monetary again). Thua, no rewriting of the act is required to reach the 
conduct of September 11. . 
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The breadth of "terrorist activity" is expanded still further by the Administration's 
proposed redefinition of "engage in terrorist activity.~ Under current law, that term 
IS defined to include eng~g in or supJ;>Orting terrorist activity in any way. 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(aX3XBXiii). The Administration proposes to exeand it to include anr. 
associational activity in support of a "terrorist organization. Section 201(aXIXC . 
And because the INS has argued that a terrorist organization is any group that has 
ever engaged in terrorist activity, as defined in the INA, irrespective of any lawful 
activities that the group engages in, this definition would potentially reach any 
group that ever used or threatened to use a "firearm or other weapon~ against per-
son or property.3 
The Administration's bill contains no requirement that the alien's support have 
any connection whatsoever to terrorist activity. Thus, an alien who sent coloring 
boOks to a day-care center run by an organization that was ever involved in armed 
struggle would appear to be deportable as a terrorist, even if she could show that 
the coloring books were used only by l3-year olds. Indeed, the law apparently ex-
tends even to those who seek to support a group in the interest of countering ter-
rorism. Thus, an immigrant-who offered his sel'Vlces in peace negotiating to the IRA 
in the hope of furthering the peace process in Great Britain and forestalling further 
violence would appear to be deportable as a terrorist. 
The bill also contains no r~uirement that the organization's use of violence be 
contemporaneous with the aid vovided. An alien would appear to be deportable as 
a terrorist for making a JonatlC ... ) to the Mrican National Congress today, because 
fifteen years ago it used military as well as peaceful means to oppose apartneid. 
And unlike the 1996 statute barring fundinl; to designated foreign terrorist 
groups, the Administration bill does not distinguIsh between foreign and domestic 
organizations. Thus, immigrants would appear to be deportable as terrorists for par-
ing dues to an American pro-life f~UP or environmental organization that ever 10 
its_past used or threatened to use a weapon against person or property. 
The net effect of the Administration's expansion of the defimtion of "engage in ter· 
rorist activity" and "terrorist activity" is to make a substantial amount of wholly in-
nocent, nonviolent associational conduct a deportable offense. By severing any tie 
between the support provided and terrorist activity of any kind, the bill indulges 
in guilt by association. Douglas Kmiec disputes this assertion in his testimony, but 
in doing so refers not to the AdministratIOn's _proposal, but to the PATRIOT Act. 
Kmiec Statement at 7. Even as to the PATRIOT Act, however, Professor Kmiec is 
Thf' PATRIOT Act seeks to strike a compromise on the issue of guilt by associa-
tion. It gives the Administration what it seeks-the power to impose guilt by asso-
ciation-for support of any group designated as a foreign terronst organization by 
the Secretary of State under 8 U.S.C. ~ 1189. An alien who sends humanitarian aid 
to a designated foreign terrorist group would be deportable, without more. But for 
those groups that are not designated, the bill requires a nexus to terrorist activity: 
the alien would be deportable only if he provided support to a non·designated group 
in circumstances in which he knew, or reasonably should have known, that his sup-
port was furthering terroliGt activity. Thus, for designated groups, the PATRIOT 
Act permits guilt by association, but for non-designated groups, the PATRIOT Act 
retains the existing requirement that the INS show a nexus between the alien's act 
of support and some terrorist activity. The compromise reflected in the PATRIOT 
Act thus properly eliminates guilt by association for non-designated groups, but ex-
pressly authorizes guilt by association for any organization designated by the Sec-
retary of State under 8 U.S.C. § 1189. 
In my view, the principle that people should be held responsible for their own in-
dividual" conduct, and not for the wron«doing of those with whom they are merely 
associated, brooks no compromise. GUilt by association, the Supreme Court has 
ruled, violates the First and the Fifth Amendments.4 It viola~ the First Amend-
3 In the Administration draft circulated Wednesday, September 19. terrorist organization was 
ellpreuly defined w include any group that has ever engaged in or provided material support 
to a terrorist activity, irrespective of any other fully lawful activities that the group may engage 
in. In the revised draft circulated Thursday, September 20! the bill deleted the definition of ter-
rorist organization, but still made any support of a terronst organization a deportable offense. 
This is even worse from a notice perspective, as it makes aliens deportable for providing support 
to an entity that is underfined. In litigation, the INS has argued that the term Uterrorist organi· 
zation" means any group that has ever committed "terrorist activity." as the tenn is defined in 
the INA. 
4The First and Fifth amendments apply to citizens and aliens residin in the United States. 
Kwong Hoi Chew v. Colding. 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953). Mr. Kmiec 8u~st that this is wrong 
beca\llle the First and Fifth Amendments do not extend w aliens seeking entry from abroad. 
Kmiec Statement at 8. But of course such aliens are not residing in the United States. The Suo 
.~-. 
/ 
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ment becauae people have a riJrht to auoc:iate with groups that have lawful and un-
lawful ends. Accordingly, the Court haa ruled that one can be held ~naible for 
one's aaaociational ties to a group ~ if the government proves "specific intent" to 
further the group's unlawful endS. Un~d Stales v. &bel, 389 U.S. 258,262 (1967). 
Guilt by' 8a8Odation also violates the FiftJi Amendment, becauae "in our juri1ru. 
dence guilt is personal." Scak8 v. United Statu, 367 U.S. 203. (1961). To hoI an 
alien responsible for the military acta of the ANC fifteen yean ago becauae he offen 
a donation today, or for providing peace negotiating training to the IRA, violates 
that principle. Without some connection between the alien's support and terrorist 
actiVity, the Constitution is violated. Douglas Kmiec argues that the guilt by asso-
ciation cases "deai with domestic civil rights." Kmiec Statement .at 7.10 fact, this 
principle was developed with respect to association with the Communist Party, an 
orgaruzation that Conpess found to be, and the Supreme Court accepted as, a for-
eign-dorninated orgaruzation that used &8bota~ and terrorism for the purnose of 
overthrowing the United States by force and VIolence. Yet even as it accepte<J those 
findings as to the Communist P4rty, the Court held that guilt by aSSOClation was 
no.tpennissible. . 
The guilt by association provisions of the Administration bill also suffer from tre· 
mendous notice problems. In the most recent draft, "terrorist organization" is wholly 
undefined, yet an alien can lose his right to remain in this country for supporting 
such an undefined entity. Is a terrorist organization one that engages exclusively 
in terrori8Dl, primarilr ill terrorism, engagea in terrorism now, or ever engaged in 
terrorism? The definition proff",red in the Administration's Wednesday draft, and ar-
gued for by the INS in litigatIon, does not solve the notice problem, because it is 
80 broad that it encompas8e8 literally thousands of groups that ever used or threat-
ened to use a weapon. Any alien who so~ht to provide humanitarian aid to any 
group would have to conduct an extensive mvestigation to ensure that neither the 
organization nor any subgroup of it ever used or threatened to use a weapon. . 
Congress repudiated guilt by' association in 1990 when it repealed the McCarran-
Walter Act/rovisions of the INA, which made proscribed association a deportable 
offense, an had long been criticized as being inconsistent with our commitments 
to political freedom. In 1989, a federal district court declared the McCarran-Walter 
Act provisions lunconstitutional. American·Arab Anti·Discrimination Comm. v. 
Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1989), rev'd in part and affd in part on other 
grounds, 970 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1991). In 1990, Congress repealed those provisions. 
Yet the Administration would resurrect this long-rejected and unconstitutional phi-
losophy. 
B. TIlE ADMINISTRATION'S BILL WOULD APPLY ITS EXPANDED GROUNDS 
FORDEPORTATION RETROACTIVELY, so THAT ALIENS WOULD BE DEPORTED FOR CON-
DUCT FULLY LAWFUL AT THE TIME THEY ENGAGED m IT 
The expansive definitions of "terrorist activity" and "engage in terrorist activity" 
detailed above are exacerbated by the fact that they apply retroactively, to conduct 
engaged in before the effective date of the Act. Since the principal effect of the Ad-
ministration's new definitions is to render deportable cor.duct that is now wholly 
lawful, this raises serious problems of fundamental fairness. 
As noted above, aliens are currently deportable for engaging in or supporting ter-
rorist activity. However, the new law would add as new grounds of deportation 
wholly innocent and nonviolent associational support of political organizations that 
have at .some time used a weapon. activity. Even to apply that ground prospectively 
raises substantial First and Fifth Amendment concerns, as noted above. But to 
apply it retroactively is grossly unfair. 
Moreover, retroactive application would serve no security purpose whatsoever. 
Since under current law any alien supportinx terrorist activity is already deport-
able, the only aliens who would be affected by the bill's retroactive application 
wowd be those who were not supporting terrorist activity - the immigrant who do-
nated to the peaceful anti-apartheid activities of the ANC, or who provided peace-
making training to the IRA, or who made a charitable donation of his time or money 
preme Court has long distinguished between aliens are not residing in the United States. The 
Supreme Court has long distinguished between aliens seeking entry from outaide our borders, 
who hsve no constitutional protectiona, and aliena here, whether here legally or illegally. who 
are protected by the First and Fifth AMendments to the Constitution. The Court reiterated this 
basic point apparently missed by Mr. Kmiec. as recently as last tenn, in ZMlduydtu v Davu, 
121 S. Ct. 2491, 2500 (2001) (~onoe an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance Chll!l8es. 
(or the due process here is lawful unlawful, temporary, or permanent." The Supreme COurt 
could not have been any dearer in COidi"ll, in which it stated that neither Firat or Fifth Amend-
ments "aeknowioldgee any diatinetion- between ~tit.ena and aliena residing here. 
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to the lawful activities of an environmental or pro-life group that once engaged in 
violence. There ia simply no justification for retroactively imposing on such conduct 
- fully lawful today - the penalty of deportation. 
The PATRIOT Act largely solves the retroactivity problem, at lea8t with respect 
to the guilt by association Pl'9vi8ions, by limiting ita newly expanded grounds or de-
portation for support of designated terrorist organizations to 8Upport provided after 
the deaignations were made. Since the designation already triggers a criminal pen-
alty under current law, most aliens affected by thia provision even for pre-Act con-
duct would not be able to claim that they were beil!g deported for conduct that was 
legal when they engaged in it. However, the PATRIOT Act would present some 
retroactivity problama. Under the existing criminal proviai;)n8 for material 8UPP'lrt 
to terrorist organizations, it ia lawful to send medicine or religiou8 materials to a 
designated group. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A. Yet the PATRIOT Act would make such con-
duct, even conduct engaged in before the PATRIOT Act took effect, a deportable of-
fense. There is no warrant for deporting people for providing humanitarian aid at 
a time when it was fully legal to do so. 
C. THE MANDATORY DETENTION PROVISION SECTION VIOLATES DUE PROCESS BY AU-
THORIZING INDEFINITE UNILATERAL EXECUTIVE DETENTION IRRESPECTIVE 
OFWHETHER THE ALIEN CAN BE DEPORTED 
The Administration bill would amend current INS det ~ntion authority to provide 
for ~mandatory detention" of aliens certified br. the Attorney General as persons who 
may "commit, further, or facilitate acts descnbed in.sections 237(a)(4)(A)(I), (A)(iii), 
or (B), or engage in any other activity that endangers the national security of the 
United States." Section 202(1)(e)(3). Such persons would be detained indefinitely, 
even if they are granted relief from removal, and therefore have a legal right to re-
main here. This provision would authorize the INS to detain persons whom it has 
no authority to deport, and without even instituting deportation proceedin~s against 
them, simply on an executive determination that there is "reason to beheve that 
the alien "may commit" a "terrorist activity." 
To appreciate the extraordinary breadth of this unprecedented power, one must 
recall the expansive definition of "terrorist activity" and "engage in terrorist activ-
ity" noted above. This bill would mandate detention of any alien who the INS has 
"reason to believe" may provide humanitarian aid to the African National Congress, 
peace training to the IRA, or might get into a domestic dispute or barroom brawl. 
There is surely no warrant for preventive detention of such people, much less man-
datory detention on a "reason to believe" standard. Mr. Kmiec, defending the provi-
sion, suggests that these examples are unlikely to arise. But the point is that any 
provision so broad as to permit such applications is in no way narrowly tailored to 
addressing true terrorist threats. 
Current law is sufficient to meet the country's needs in fighting terrorism. The 
INS is authorized to detain without bond any alien in a removal proceeding who 
poses a threat to nati:mal security or a risk of flight. It routinely does so. It also 
has authority, as illustrated in recent weeks, to detain aliens without charges for 
up to 48 hours, and in extraordinary circumstances, for a reasonable period of time. 
This provision raises four basic concerns. First, it is plainly unconstitutional, be-
cause it mandates detention of persons who pose no threat to national security or . 
risk of flight. If the Attorney General certifies that an individual may provide hu-
manitarian support to a group that has engaged in a civil war, for example, the per-
son is subject to mandatory detention, without any requirement that the alien cur-
rently poses a threat to national security or risk of flight. . 
The mandatory detention provision is a form of preventive detention prior to trial. 
But the Supreme Court has held that "fi]n our society, liberty is the norm, and de-
tention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception." United 
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). Preventive detention is constitutional 
only in very limited circumstances, where there is a demonstrated need for the de-
tention-because of current dangerousness or risk of flight-and onlr where there 
are adequate procedural safeguards. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746 (upholding preventive 
detention only where there is a showing of threat to others or risk of flight, where 
the detention is limited in time, and adequate procedural safeguards are provided); 
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (civil commitment constitutional only 
where individual has a harm-threatening mental illness, and adequate procedural 
protections are provided); Zadvydas v. Davis, 121 S., Ct. 2491, 249S-99 (2001) (ex-
plaining constitutional limits on preventive detention, and interpreting immigration 
statute not to permit indefinite detention of deportable aliens). Where there is no 
showing that the alien poses a threat to national security or 8 risk of flight, there 
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ts no justifieation whatsoever (or detention, and any such detention would violate 
subatantive due procesS. 
Second, the detention authority proposed would allow the INS to detain aliena in-
definitely, even where they have prevailed in their removal ~roceedinn. This, too, 
ts patently unconatitutiowil. Once an alien has prevailed in his remov8I pr~, 
and baa been granted relief from removal, he has a legal right to remain here. Yet 
the Administration p~ would provide that even 8.lien8 granted relief from re-
moval would still be detained.s At that~int, however, the INS has no 184Ptimate 
basia for detaining the individual. The INS's authority to detain is only inCIdent to 
its removal authority. !fit cannot remove an individual, it baa no baais for detaining 
him. Zadvydos v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2491 (holding that INS could not detain indefi-
nitely even aliens flUed deportable where there was no te880nable likelihood that 
th~ could be deported because no country would take them).' 
Third, the standard for detention is va.sue and insufficiently demanding, and 
raiBe8 serious constitutional concerna. It is Important to keep in mind that the bill 
propoaes to authorize mandatory and potentially indefinite detention. That is a far 
more severe deprivation o( liberty than holding a person for interrogation or trial. 
Yet the INS has in litigation argued that "reason to believe" is essentially equiva-
lent to the "reasonable 8UBpicion" required for a brief stop and frisk under the 
Fourth Amendment.The Constitution would not permit the INS to detain an alien 
indefinitely on mere "reasonable auspicion," a standard which does not even author-
ize a custodial arrest in criminal law enforcement. 
Fourth, and most importantly, it ia critical to the constitution~' of any execu-
tive detention provision that the ~reon detained have a meanin opportunity to 
contest his detention both admirustratively and in court. INS v. t. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. 
2271 (2001). I read the judicial review provision as authorizing judicial review of 
the evidentiary basis for detention, and as authorizing the reviewmg court to order 
release if the evidence does not support the Attorney General's determination that 
the alien poses a current threat to national security. In any event, such review 
would be constitutionally required: aliens may not be deprived of their liberty with· 
out notice of the basis for the detention and a meaniniful opportunity to confront 
and rebut the evidence against them. See, e.g., Landoll v, PlGsencia, 459 U.S. 21, 
34 (1982); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953); American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995), Rafeedie v. INS, 880 
F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1989); AI Najjar v. RenoJ 97 F. Supp,.2d 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2000); Ktareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp.2d 402 (D.N.t!. 1999). Uiillateral executive detention 
knows no pl!lce in American law. 
The PATRIOT Act's mandatory detention provision share many of the above 
flaws. Most problematically, it, too, authorizes preventive detention without any 
showing that an alien poses any current danger to national security or a risk of 
flight. It only requires the Attorney General to certify that an alien "is described" 
in various deportation or exclusion provisions. These in<:lude aliens who the Attor-
ney General believes may be mere members of designated foreign terrorist groups, 
and any alien involved in a domestic dispute or a barroom brawl In which a weapon 
or other object was used with intent to endanger person or property. Even if such 
aliens pose no threat to others or risk of flight, they are subject to mandatory deten-
tion. 
In addition, like the Administration's proposal, the PATRIOT Act permits indefi-
nite detention. The PATRIOT Act adds a requirement that the ~overnment file im-
migration or criminal charges against an- alien mandatorily detained within 7 days, 
but that is a largely irrelevant protection, because the provision authorize8 indefi-
nite detention even of thoae aliens who prevail in their deportation proceedings. The 
requirement that charges be filed means nothing if the resolution of those charges 
in the alien's favor haa no effect on the detention. 
The judicial review provision of the PATRIOT Act marks an improvement on the 
Administration proposal by clarifying explicitly that judicial review would include 
review of the merits of the Attorney General's certification decision, ~d by barring 
5 In many instances,an alien who poBe8 a threat to national security will not be eligible for 
discretionary relief. 
e While the Court in Zadvyda8 left undecided the question of indefinite detention of a deport-
able alien where applied "narrowly to 'a amall segment of particularly dangerous individuals,' 
say suapecte4 terronsta,~ 121 S. Ct. at 2499, the Court did not decide that such detention would 
be permissible ,ince the question was not preeen~. Moreover, the Administration's proposed 
definition of "terrorist activity" would not be limited to a narrow, ",mall segment of particularly 
dangerous individual,,~ 88 te Court in Zadvydas contemplated, but to garden variety criminals 
barroom brawlea, and those who have supported no violent activity whatsoever, but provid;;;{ 
hl1.llWlitarian IIUpport to the Mean NatioriaJ CoI1gre8ll. It begs credulit] to characterize such 
an open-ended authority aa limited to a ".mall eegment of particularly <18ngerous individual .... 
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delegation "below the INS Commisaioner of the certification decision. But like the 
AdmiJiiatration provision, it affords the alien no administrative opportunity tn de-
fend himself, and therefore violates due process. 
D. '!HE BILL RESURRECTS IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION, BARRINO ENTRY TO ALIENS BASED 
ON PURE SPEECH 
The bill would also amend the grounds of inadmiasibility. These grounds would 
apply not only to aliens seeking to enter the country for the first time, but also to 
aliens living here who seek to apply for various immigration benefits, such as ad-justment of status to permanent resident, and to permanent residents seeking to 
enter the country after a trip abroad. 
The bill expands current law by excluding aliens who "endorse or espouse ter-
rorist activity," or who "persuade others to support terrorist activity or a terrorist 
organization," in ways t6at the Secretary of State determines undermine U.S. ef-
forts to combat terrorism. Section 201(aXl). It also excludes aliens who are rep-
resentatives of groups that "endorse acts of terrorist activity" in ways that similarly 
undermine U.S. efforts to combat terrorism. 
Excluding people for their ideas is flatly cOntrary to the spirit of freedom for 
which the United States stands. It was for that reason that Congress repealed all 
such grounds in the INA in 1990, after years of embarraasing visa denials for polit-
ical reasons. ' . 
Moreover, because of the breadth of the definitions of "terrorist activity" and "ter-
rorist organizations," this authority would empower the government to deny entry 
to any alien who advocated support for the ANC, for the contras during the war 
against the Sandinistas, or for opposition forces in Afghanistan and Iran today. Be-
cause all of these groups have used force or violence, they would be terrorist organi-
zations. and anyone who urged people to support them would be excludable on the 
Secretary of State's say-so. 
The PATRIOT Act shares this problem, and goes further, by rendering aliens de-
portable for their speech. However, it qualifiea the deportation provisions with the 
requirement that the speech be intended and likely to promote or incite imminent 
lawleas action, the constitutional minimum required before speech advocating illegal 
conduct can be penalized. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
CONCLUSION 
In responding to terrorism, we must ensure that our responses are measuredand 
balanced. Is it a measured response to terrorism· to make deportable anyone who 
provides humanitarian aid to the African National Congress today? Is it measured 
to deport aliens for donating their time to a pro-life group that once engaged in an 
act of violence but no longer does so? Is it measured to deport an immigrant who 
sends human rights pamphlets to an organization fighting a civil war? Is it meas-
ured to label any domestic dispute or barroom fight with a weapon an act of ter-
rorism? Is it measured to subject anyone who might engalfe in such activity subject 
to mandatory detention? Is it measured to restore exclUSIOn for ideas? Is it meas-
ured to make aliens deportable for peaceful conduct fully lawful at the time they 
engaged in it? . 
I submit that the Administration's proposal falls short in all of these respects. The 
overbreadth of the bill reflects the overreaction that we have often indulged in when 
threatened. The expansive alithorities that the Administration bill grants, moreover, 
are not likely to make us safer. To the contrary, by penalizing even wholly lawful, 
nonviolent, and counterterrorist associational activity, we are likely to drive such ac-
tivity underground, to encourage extremists, and to make the communities that will 
inevitably be targeted by such broad-brush measures disinclined to cooperate with 
law enforcement. As Justice Louis Brandeis wrote nearly 75 years ago, the Framers 
of our Constitution knew "that fear breeds I'epression; that repression breeds hate; 
and that hate menaces stable government." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 
(1927). In other words, freedom and security need not necessarily be traded off 
against one another; maintaining our freedoms is itself critical to maintaining our 
security. 
The Administration'8 bill fails to live up to the very commitments to freedom that 
the President has said that we are fighting for. As the Supreme Court wrote in 
1967, declaring invalid an anti-Communist law, "'It would indeed be ironic if, in the 
name of national defen&e, we would sanction the lubversion of one of those lib-
ertiee-the freedom of association-which makes the defense of the Nation worth-
while." United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967). 
